The Use of Scripture for the Refutation of Error According to St. Thomas Aquinas

Revelation, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains,^[1] is necessary to man’s salvation. ln order that man may know his true end, according to Thomas, man must know some things that exceed his natural and unaided intellectual abilities, and some other things that, though they do not exceed his unaided abilities, could only be known by a few, after a long effort and with much admixture of error. Without revelation, then, man would be in a state of ignorance and error. It is therefore fitting that the purpose of revelation be to remedy man’s ignorance and to refute his errors. The problem I wish to discuss in this essay is how, according to the doctrine of Thomas, revelation is used to refute error in matters of faith.

The public and supernatural sources of revelation,^[2] that is, the only sources of revelation that can serve as a foundation for theology, are two: Scripture and apostolic tradition. As the Church teaches, and as Thomas was aware, the divinely revealed, public Deposit of Faith was completely given during apostolic times and was given to the Church in two ways: written Scripture and oral tradition in the words of Christ and of the apostles.^[3]

Thomas, however, when he discusses the principles and methods of theology,^[4] does not mention tradition but only Scripture as a source of revelation from which the theologian can argue to refute error. Thomas does not mention tradition because, as Godefridus Geenen points out,^[5] it is not an auctoritas in the Scholastic sense of the term, i.e., tradition is not a written text. Since it is not a written text tradition can be known directly and with certainty only by the Magisterium of the Church.

lndirectly, the theologian can know about tradition in that he can learn the teaching of the Church and that of her Fathers, Doctors, and theologians, in which tradition is reflected. But the teaching of the Church, which discloses tradition, is yet distinct from it; and it is only the teaching and not the tradition that is directly accessible to the theologian. However infallible and guided by the Holy Spirit, the teaching of the Church is not revelation. When a theologian reads St. Augustine or a papal pronouncement, he is not reading a source of revelation, though he may well be reading something that accurately represents tradition, which is a source of revelation. Since the theologian cannot know tradition directly, it is not his business to use tradition as a basis for argument; rather, it is the place of the Magisterium of the Church to teach her dogma on the basis both of Scripture and of tradition. The theologian is to be guided by tradition, insofar as he is guided by the teaching of the Church; but he cannot argue from it directly, for he does not know it directly. A fine example of the way in which the theologian should be guided by tradition is Thomas’s own Catena aurea. There Thomas compiles quotations from his own summaries of the thinking of the Church Fathers, both Latin and Greek, in an orderly fashion so as to provide a gloss on the four Gospels. The purpose of such a compilation is, as Thomas says, both “to demolish error, as well as to confirm the Catholic Truth.”^[6] Thus, tradition, indirectly present in the sententiae of the Fathers, helps to make the meaning of Scripture clear, and this meaning is used to refute error and to establish the truth.

The teaching of the Church, the writings of her Doctors, Fathers, and theologians are auctoritates, to be sure, but they are not revealed auctoritas, as Scripture is. Therefore, Thomas says that Scripture is the source of revelation from which the theologian argues “properly and necessarily.”^[7] Thus it is that the problem for this essay can be posed in the following way: how, according to Thomas, ought the theologian use Scripture to refute error?

I. The Sort of Error Scripture Can Be Used to Refute

ln the Summa theologiae, l, q. 1, a. 8, Thomas explains that what is true for any of the philosophical sciences is also true for theology, namely, that theology can only argue against those who concede at least one of her principles. Against those who deny all her principles, theology can make no properly theological argument. She can, however, “solve” (solvere) the arguments of such opponents, which is to say that she can show them to be not demonstrative but only dialectical arguments. To solve the arguments of those who concede none of theology’s principles is not to argue theologically from the revealed principles of theology but merely to argue from the principles of logic and thereby to show that such arguments brought against theology are not demonstrative. On the other hand, those revealed principles of theology that are accepted by an opponent can be used to refute the opponent’s erroneous denial of other principles of theology. Scripture can be used to refute only the errors of those who concede at least something of the faith whose revealed principles Scripture contains.

Scripture is a source for the refutation of error in those things that pertain to the faith; but what does it mean “to pertain to the faith”? Thomas writes,

It ought to be said that ‘something pertains to the faith’ in two ways. ln one way directly, such as those things which are principally revealed to us, as that God is three in one, that the Son of God is incarnate, and things of this sort. To opine falsely concerning these things brings eo ipso heresy, especially if obstinacy be included. Indirectly, on the other hand, those things pertain to the faith from which [upon their being denied] something contrary to the faith follows; if, for example, someone should say that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for from this if follows that Divine Scripture is false. Therefore, with respect to things of this sort, someone can opine falsely without the danger of heresy, before it be considered or be determined that from this follows something contrary to the faith, especially if he not adhere obstinately to it. But after it is made clear, and especially if it be determined by the Church, that from this follows something contrary to the faith, to err in this would not be without heresy. And because of this many things are now considered heretical, which were not so considered before, because it is now clearer what follows from them.^[8]

This passage makes it clear that there are two sorts of things that pertain to the faith: 1) those things the very denial of which brings heresy, which are called the Articles of Faith;^[9] 2) those things the denial of which would imply a denial of an Article of Faith. If we can now know what Thomas means by an Article of Faith, we shall have a clear sense of what things pertain to the faith.

Thomas was the first theologian to define Article of Faith in the way in which it is still used in Catholic doctrine, although instances can be found of the term being used perhaps a century before Thomas.^[10] From Thomas’s discussion of the term^[11] we can discern four characteristics of an Article of Faith. (1) lt must be revealed and it must be the sort of revealed thing that could not be known by man if it were not revealed.^[12] (2) lt must have as its object one of the things that Christian s hope to enjoy in the beatific vision,  and the believing of an Article of Faith must directly ordain the Christian toward his eternal life. ln the beatific vision, the Christian hopes to contemplate such things as the Trinity and the Incarnate Christ, which he must now believe as mysteries. (3) Each article must be fitted to all the other articles in such a way that all of the articles form a coherent system. The Articles of Faith are fitted together like the parts of a living organism, or like the parts of speech in a language. (4) Each has its own special ratio. This is to say that each Article of Faith presents a unique difficulty to the intellect of the believer. Thus, for example, the fact that Christ suffered and the fact that He was resurrected are truths that present separate difficulties to the believer, and each is therefore a separate Article of Faith. On the other hand, the fact that Christ suffered and the fact that He died do not involve separate difficulties for the believer and are not separate Articles of Faith.

The Articles of Faith have been completely promulgated by the Church in her creeds and are unchanging; there are seven Articles that pertain to the Trinity and seven that pertain to the Incarnation.^[13] The creeds of the Church may at times include all of the Articles of Faith, and at other times may include only some. But the creeds never add to the Articles of Faith, although they may explain or draw out the implications of one Article or another in order to make the doctrine of the Church clear.

Any error that either is or implies a denial of an Article of Faith is the sort of error that the theologian can use Scripture to refute. Before, however, we go on to see how Scripture can be so used, it will be useful to see what Thomas means by ” heresy,” so as not to confuse the term with a simple error in matters of faith.

Thomas gives a helpful set of distinctions in the De malo q. 8, a. 1, where he distinguishes among nescience, ignorance, error, and heresy.

. . . it ought to be said that four things pertain to a defect of knowledge, namely, nescience, ignorance, error, and heresy. Nescience is common among these because it indicates a simple lack of knowledge, whence Denys holds that even in angels there is a certain nescience, as is clear in the 6th chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. Ignorance, however, is a certain nescience, that is, of those things that man is naturally able to know and ought to know. Error, however, adds beyond ignorance a conformity of the mind to what is contrary to the truth, for the assenting to false things in place of true pertains to error. But heresy, beyond error, adds something from the side of the matter, because it is an error about those things which pertain to the Faith, and from the side of the one in error, because it indicates obstinacy, which alone makes a heretic; such obstinacy, to be sure, arises from pride, for it is great pride that man should prefer his own opinion to the truth divinely revealed.^[14]

Error involves assenting to what is false, or, as Thomas says elsewhere in the same work^[15] “opining” (ferre sententiam) what is false as though it were true. Heresy is the obstinate erring in what pertains to the faith. Since not all errors in what pertains to the faith are heretical, although any such error could be, it will be enough for the purpose of this essay to say that Scripture is used to refute errors in what pertains to the faith, whether such errors be heretical or not.

II. How Scripture ls Used to Refute Error

ln order to use Scripture to refute error, we must know what Scripture means. Most of those who fall into error on matters of faith accept the authority of Scripture but differ from orthodox theologians in what they take the meaning of Scripture to be. Presumably, at least, most heterodox theologians could be shown their error if they could only be shown what Scripture really means. ln Scholastic terms, the problem for the orthodox theologian who wants to refute error is, what is the sense (sensus) of Scripture?

Scripture, according to Thomas, has two fundamental senses: the literal and the spiritual.^[16] The spiritual sense, further, is subdivided into three senses: the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical. There are also in Thomas’s doctrine, as we shall see later, certain “secondary” or “adapted” senses of Scripture, senses that are neither the real literal sense nor the spiritual sense of Scripture. The literal sense is distinguished from the spiritual in that the literal sense is the signification of things by words, whereas the spiritual sense is the signification of things by things. The words in the text of Scripture signify certain things, and such signification is the literal sense of Scripture; but the things signified by the words of Scripture are themselves, in most instances, also significant of other things. God is the author not only of the words in the text of Scripture but also of the things which are signified by the words of Scripture. Thus, it is in God’s power as dual author not only to make words signify, but also to make things signify.^[17]

Thomas understands the Bible primarily to be a kind of history book that literally tells of events (things) that really did happen, that really are happening, and that really will happen. The sense according to which the events of history-—past, present, and future—are signified is the literal or, as Thomas frequently calls it, the historical sense of Scripture. God is not only the author of the Bible but also of the events of sacred history and indeed of all history. What Scripture literally signifies, after all, is a part of God’s creation. Thus, God can and does make the events of sacred history to be significant, and therefore, when we study, through the Bible, the signification of the events of sacred history, we are studying the spiritual sense of Scripture.

The Bible, of course, is much more than a record of sacred history and it would be wrong to think that by “things” Thomas only means historical events. The theological explanations of St. Paul, the precepts contained throughout the Bible, the prophecy, and the poetry all show that the scope of the Bible is much wider than that of history. Still, the principle of distinguishing the literal from the spiritual sense holds throughout the whole of Scripture: when the words are signifying things, the signification is literal; when the signified things are doing the signifying, the signification is spiritual.

Of the two fundamental Scriptural senses, the literal holds the place of primacy in theological arguments. Any matter of faith revealed in Scripture, if it is revealed in a spiritual sense, will also be revealed literally elsewhere in Scripture; and only the literal sense can be used as the basis for arguments in matters of faith.

It ought to be said that the multiplicity of these senses [of Scripture, namely, the literal and the spiritual] does not make equivocation or any kind of multiplicity because, as has already been said, these senses are not multiple because one word signifies many things but because the things signified through words can be the signs of other things. And thus also it follows that there is no confusion in Sacred Scripture since all the senses are founded on one, namely, the literal, from which alone can an argument be taken—not from these things which are said according to allegory, as Augustine says in his letter, Contra Vincentium. Nevertheless, as a result of this it is not the case that something is lost to Scripture, for nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense that Scripture does not bring out manifestly elsewhere through the literal sense.^[18]

However true it may be that the things signified through words can signify many other things, the words themselves, in the doctrine of Thomas, can have only a single signification. This is not to say, however, that there cannot be equivocal terms in Scripture, e.g., words that are used properly in one context and figuratively in another, but rather that the literal signification of any given word in any given context must be unique. The words used in Scripture can be equivocal, from one passage to another, but the literal sense of Scripture, in any given passage, cannot be. The word “thief,” for example, is used figuratively in a parable by Christ to refer to His Second Coming. “You know as well as I that if the head of the house knew when the thief was coming he would not let him break into his house. Be on guard, therefore. The Son of Man will come when you least expect Him” (Luke 12:29–49). The same word, on the other hand, is used properly by Paul simply to signify a thief. ” Do not deceive yourselves: no fornicators, idolaters, or adulterers, no sexual perverts, sodomites, thieves, misers, or drunkards, no slanderers or robbers will inherit God’s kingdom” (1 Cor. 6:9–10). The word “thief” literally signifies one thing in one passage and literally signifies some other thing in another passage, but in each passage the literal signification is unique and unequivocal.

Thomas’s chief points here about Scripture and theology are that theology is an argumentative science^[19] and that the premises of theological arguments are taken from one of the senses of Scripture. ln order that any argument be valid, its terms must be used univocally throughout the argument. Therefore, Thomas must conclude, the sense of Scripture, from which the terms of theological argument are taken, must itself yield terms that can only be used univocally. Thomas explains, in a quodlibetal question, that, although the spiritual sense of Scripture is truly from the authority of God, since the spiritual sense of its very nature can involve equivocation, theological arguments can be taken only from the literal sense, where there is no equivocation.

It ought to be said that it is not because of a defect of authority that valid argument ca n not be taken from the spiritual sense, but from the very nature of similitude, in which the spiritual sense is founded. For one thing can be similar to many; whence you cannot proceed determinately from the thing, when it is set forth in Sacred Scripture, to some other thing—this is a fallacy of the consequent. For example, a lion because of some similitude signifies Christ and the Devil; whence, by the fact that something in Sacred Scripture is said about a lion, you can proceed to neither Christ nor the Devil, through arguing in Sacred Scripture.^[20]

Clearly, for Thomas, it would be impossible to appeal to Scripture as an authority for argument if the sense of the authority to which one appealed were in any way multiple. If Scripture is the revealed source of the principles of theological argument, then the literal sense of Scripture must necessarily signify only one thing.

The determination of the literal sense on Thomistic principles is difficult, however, for three reasons. First, as Thomas defines the literal sense, it includes metaphor, and thus the exegete’s task must be to understand when the words of Scripture are being used figuratively and when properly. Second, Thomas does speak at times about senses of Scripture that are in accord with the literal sense but are neither the literal nor the spiritual sense; what are these other senses? Third, to what extent, if any, does the determination of the literal sense depend upon a knowledge of the intention of the author of Scripture? Let us examine each of these problems in turn.

(1) The author of Scripture fittingly uses metaphor, Thomas explains,^[21] because he is revealing things that are divine and spiritual to men whose knowledge always begins with sensation. Thus, it is necessary that the truth of immaterial reality be set forth to man in the figures of corporeal things. Furthermore, metaphors are helpful to those of weaker intellect who could more easily grasp a  image than the reality indicated by the image. But how is the exegete to know when the words of Scripture are being used figuratively and when properly?

Thomas’s principle for knowing when a term is applied metaphorically to God is a simple one: any term that includes in its meaning any sense of creaturely imperfection can only be predicated of God metaphorically.

It ought to be said that certain names signify perfections that proceed from God to creatures such that the imperfect mode itself by which the creature participates in the divine perfection is included in the thing signified by the name, as ‘stone’ signifies something existing materially, and names of this sort can only be attributed to God metaphorically. Certain names, on the other hand, signify absolutely the perfections themselves, without there being any mode of participation included in their signification, as ‘being’ (ens), ‘good,’ ‘living,’ and names of this sort; and such names are said properly of God.^[22]

Any term of that includes within its meaning the notion of creaturely participation, such as the notions of potentiality, finitude, temporality, and so forth, can only be predicated of God metaphorically.

The principle Thomas states here for recognizing when terms are used metaphorically of God is, in fact, the same principle that any reader uses for recognizing when any term is being used metaphorically. When the Psalmist speaks of the “arm” or the “right hand” of God (Psalm 44:4), we cannot understand that he is speaking metaphorically of the Power of God unless we understand that God is the sort of being who does not have an arm. To understand any metaphorical predication, some prior knowledge is called for—a fact which causes no problem in most cases but which is a little surprising in the case of God. The purpose of reading the Bible is, after all, to learn about God and other revealed things. Yet the very nature of metaphor requires that anyone reading the Bible to learn about God must have some prior knowledge of God to understand the Bible. Here we see clearly the theologian’s need of a prior natural theology, or of a prior faith from indirect revelation (tradition), or of both.

(2) A second problem concerning the determination of the literal sense is the problem of distinguishing senses, neither spiritual nor literal, but in accord with the literal, from the literal sense. Two texts of Thomas, De potentia, q. 4, a. 1 and Summa theologiae, l, q. 1, a. 10, have given Thomas’s interpreters some difficulty over this problem.

In De potentia, q. 4, a. 1, Thomas discusses the exegesis of Genesis 1:2 “Terra autem erat inanis et vacua.” Thomas is not concerned here to give his own explanation of the literal sense of the sentence, but rather wishes to show that two great authorities on the text, Augustine and the Greek Fathers (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen), are not in fundamental disagreement.  Augustine and the Greeks disagree over what it means for the terra to be innanis et vacua, or to use the Patristic and Scholastic term, over the meaning of “unformed matter.” For Augustine, as Thomas says, “unformed matter” means a complete lacking of any form; therefore, such unformed matter cannot exist and cannot precede in duration formed matter. For the Greeks, on the other hand, “unformed matter” means, not that which lacks all form, but simply that which lacks the full perfection and beauty of its nature. The Greek sense of unformed matter is one of an incompleted material thing, as, for example, of a statue that has only been half-carved. Obviously, in the Greek sense of the term, unformed matter can precede formed matter, just as the half-carved statue precedes the completed statue in duration. This dispute is an important part of the larger dispute over whether the “six days” of the formation of the universe, as described in Genesis, indicate temporal duration or whether the entire universe was created in a state of perfection instantaneously. Thomas is not concerned, here, to resolve the dispute, for he does not think that the dispute can be resolved by the literal sense of Scripture. Rather, Thomas wishes to show that Augustine and the G reeks do not disagree over the literal sense of Scripture but over some other sense of Scripture—not a spiritual sense- -that goes beyond the literal sense and yet is in accord with it. Therefore, Thomas can make the following remark:

…it pertains to the dignity of Scripture that it contain many senses under one letter, so that, as a result, it be fitting to the diverse intellects of men thus, that each one be filled with wonder that he is able to find in divine Scripture a truth which he has mentally grasped. And because of this, Scripture is even more easily defended against the heathen, since, if something which someone wishes to understand appears to be false, there can always be recourse to another sense of Scripture . . . . Whence, every truth which can be adapted to divine Scripture, provided the letter is left intact, is its sense.^[23]

The quotation given above indicates Thomas’s recognition of secondary senses of Scripture that are in accord with the letter but are not the literal sense. When the words of Scripture signify a thing, they do not signify everything that could be known or thought about the thing. lt is therefore open to speculation to elaborate on the things that are signified literally by Scripture. Such elaborations are the truths that Thomas says can be “adapted to divine Scripture, provided the letter is left intact.”^[24] The meaning of “unformed matter” is one such elaboration upon the things signified literally by Scripture. Literally, as Thomas says elsewhere, when Scripture says terra autem erat inanis et vacua, the sense is that the land is covered by the water.^[25] But beyond the literal sense we may wish to speculate over whether the separation of land from water took place temporally after the creation of land and of water, over the nature of unformed matter, and so forth. Whatever be the results of such speculation, we must not contradict the literal sense of Scripture; whatever we find by such speculation that is true may be said to be the secondary sense of Scripture, but not the literal sense.

Thomas explains the secondary senses in accord with the letter, the “adapted senses of Scripture,” in this way:

Because the literal sense is that which the author intends—but the author of Sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends all things at once in his intellect—it is not unfitting, as Augustine says, 12 Confessions, if even in accord with the literal sense there are several senses in one letter of Scripture.^[26]

Here Thomas is talking about the spiritual senses of Scripture, but the principle expressed, that God the author of Scripture understands all things in one act, is the same principle underlying the idea that Scripture can have a multiplicity of secondary senses. God’s infinite comprehension does not limit Him to intending only one sense.

Neither the passage quoted above from the Summa theologiae nor the one from the De potentia, however, can be taken to mean that Thomas holds that there is multiplicity of literal senses.^[27] When Thomas says that there are several senses “in one letter of Scripture,” he simply means that there are several senses of Scripture but only one text. The words of the text are one and the same, for there is but una littera; nevertheless, there are several senses in the una littera and in accord with the literal sense.

(3) There is, finally, the problem of the intention of the author (intentio auctoris). Some scholars have insisted that the literal sense of Scripture is nothing other than what the human author intended by the words of the text.^[28] Thus, if it could be shown that a Hebrew prophet, for example, could not have been conscious of all that his prophecy would mean, then the full meaning of his prophecy—the sensus plenior, as some call it-—would exceed the literal sense, which is the sense intended by the human author. The full meaning of the prophecy would thus be something unknown to the prophet but knowable to the faithful of later eras in sacred history. Support for the notion that only the intention of the human author is the literal sense of Scripture can be gained from St. Jerome’s oft-quoted expression of the Biblical interpreter’s task: “to expound what the author thinks whom the interpreter is interpreting” (quid sentiat ille quem interpretatur exponere).^[29] Furthermore, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation of Vatican II enjoins the interpreter of Sacred Scripture to search out “the meaning which the sacred writers had in mind, that meaning which God had thought well to manifest through the medium of their words.”^[30]

We can, of course, never know the intention of an author, if we mean by “intention” the psychic consciousness of the author. But if the term “intention of the author” is used, as it seems to be used in the documents of Vatican ll,^[31] to mean such things as the literary form employed by the author, the customs of speech peculiar to the author’s time, the idioms of the author’s own style, and the accepted view of the world in the author’s time, then it is obvious that the interpreter of Scripture can and should understand the intention of the author, although it is equally obvious that the literal sense of Scripture is something other than the intention of the author. Still, even understanding intention of the author in this way, we might ask whether the literal sense of Scripture is limited in some way by what a human author could have been expected to have said. ls the literal sense of Scripture restricted to what historical research can establish to have been within the range of probable experiences and expectations of the human author?

For Thomas the answer to this question is “no. ” The important thing for the determination of the literal sense is not the intention of the human author but rather the signification of the words. lf anyone’s intention is important, it is the Holy Spirit’s: “…the literal sense is what the author intended, but the author of Sacred Scripture is God.^[32] We can identify the literal sense with the intention of the Holy Spirit, but not with the intention of the human author. The important thing for the interpreter of the literal sense of Scripture, as Thomas says several times, is to find the signification of the words.^[33] Thomas does not say that one must know the intention of the human author in order to know the literal sense; rather, it is what the words signify that constitutes the literal sense. ln fact, Thomas says that, at least in prophecy, the intention of the human author can be deficient of what the Holy Spirit intends in Scripture.

It ought to be known, nevertheless, that, because the mind of the prophet is a deficient instrument, as was said, even true prophets do not recognize all things which the Holy Spirit intends in their visions, words, or even deeds.^[34]

To take one important example. When Thomas comments on lsaiah 7 :14, Ecce virgo concipiet et pariet filium, et vocabit nomen eius Emmanuhel (Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son and shall call his name Emmanuel), he indicates clearly that the passage refers to Mary’s conception of and giving birth to Christ (miraculosa conceptio) and to the vocation of Christ (mirabilis generati vocatio).^[35] This is Thomas’s literal exposition, given in his Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram. Here Thomas even takes up the objection that the Hebrew word for virgo can mean, and does mean in this context, “young marriageable woman” (juvencula nubilis), not “virgin.” Thomas responds that the word must mean virgin since the conception and giving birth are intended by God to be a sign for man of the salvation God is giving to man. “Therefore the Lord himself will give you a sign.” That a young woman should conceive and give birth would be nothing special, and therefore no sign.

Thomas understood well the objection given by some that the passage in question was intended by the human author to refer to someone other than Mary. Some Hebrew expositors, says Thomas, claim that lsaiah actually had his own son in mind, supposedly named “Emmanuel.” But for Thomas the literal sense of the passage is that the Virgin Mary will conceive and give birth to her son, Jesus, whom she will call “Emmanuel.” What the prophet who wrote these words actually was or was not conscious of is not important here. The thing signified by the words of lsaiah 7:14, the literal sense of the words, is the birth of Christ.

This is not to say that Thomas’s principles are incompatible with 20th century methods of exegesis or with what is called today the ” literal sense” and the sensus plenior. Thomas would approve of the use of modern philological, historical, and archeological methods to help make the meaning of Scripture clear. What is today being called the sensus plenior Thomas would call the literal sense: that which is intended by God but not clearly by the human author and which is understood to be the sense of Scripture in the light of further revelation and of the teaching of the Church. What is today being called the “literal sense,” what the human author intended, Thomas had no technical term for, perhaps because he recognized the impossibility of ever knowing the human author’s intention. Historical research, however sophisticated, can only set certain probable limits to what a given class of men at a certain time might or might not have been aware of; historicaI research could never reveal to us the consciousness of any man, certainly not of a man under the influence of divine inspiration.

III.. Conclusion

The duty of a wise man, as Thomas says in Summa contra Gentiles 1.1, is two-fold : to argue the truth and to refute error. The wise man does not have two separate duties (duo officia) but only one duty, which is a unity of two parts (officium duplex). In fact, the difference between arguing the truth and refuting error is very small. Whether one positively advances the arguments of a science or negatively destroys those errors opposed to the science, one is arguing in essentially the same fashion.

Accordingly, Scripture is used in the same way by the theologian both to refute error and to argue for the truths of the faith. ln both efforts the theologian proceeds by arguing; in both he relies on Scripture as his direct, public source of revelation; and in both he must argue, in order to argue properly and necessarily, only from the literal sense of Scripture. Arguing the truth, however, may differ from refuting error in that the theologian who argues positively for truth may presuppose all the Articles of Faith as the principles of his arguments. The refuter of error, on the other hand, cannot presuppose all the Articles, for he is arguing against someone who denies one or more of them.