Chapter 36: Excellence with Faults is Superior

Now, then, in the case of those who are by nature great at speeches and writings—in which greatness is never apart from use and benefit—it is fitting for us to put our theory together here: 1) that though such men (those great by nature) are far from being free of mistakes, still all of them are above what is mortal; and 2) that though other things prove their users to be human beings, sublimity lifts these men almost to the greatness of mind of divinities; and 3) that though what is without a slip is not censured, what is great is actually wondered at. 2. What must one say in addition?—that each of these men often redeems his trespasses by one sublimity and correctness, and—most important—that if you selected the failings of Homer, Demosthenes, Plato, and as many of the others who are indeed greatest, and concentrated them all together in the same place, they would be found to be the least part—rather, not even an infinitesimal part—of the things done correctly everywhere by those heroes. Because of this all the ages and all of human life, which is not seized by the mindlessness of grudging envy, brings and awards the victory prize to them, and even now protects it from being removed, and is likely to keep them thus while water onward flows and while great trees are a-blooming.

3. Though of course in reply to the one who wrote that the Colossus, with its mistakes, is not better than the “Spear-bearer” by Polycleitus, it may be said (in addition to many other things) that though what is wondered at in technique is the greatest precision, in the workings of nature it is greatness, and by nature the human being is characterized by rational thought; and while in statues likeness to a human being is sought, in speeches and writings, as I said, what transcends the human is sought. 4. Still (this advice, you see, turns us back to the beginning of our collection of notes) though correctness without any slip is more a matter of technique, preemi­ nence (even though uneven) is a matter of natural greatness, so that technique must everywhere provide support for nature: you see, perfection might come from their mutual support.

So many things were necessary to decide critically on these speculations.
But let each delight in what pleases him.

Commentary

Unlike Mt. Aetna, men of genius are both sublime and useful. Longinus, for all his rhapsodic appreciation of sub­ limity, never sinks to the doctrine of “art for art’s sake.” The opening sentence, which picks up and echoes the closing sentence of the preceding chapter, is long and peri­ odic, as are the first five of the six senten­ ces which constitute the chapter. The chapter as a whole not only summarizes Longinus’ own principles but also marks the beginning of the end of the speech.

mind of divinities: in the preceding chapter, Longinus had constantly re­ ferred to nature; here he introduces the word “divinity.” The alternatives are like those of Ovid, in his account of the world’s creation (Metamorphoses 1.21): “God or a better nature.” As a Platonist, Longinus would not subscribe to the pantheism of the Stoics.

Homer, Demosthenes, Plato...: Lon­ ginus has predecessors who held his view, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells that his friend Pompeius defended Plato from strictures made by Diony­ sius (Letter to Pompeius 2):

In the other forms of expression there may well occur something which deserves mingled praise and blame. But in embellishment whatever is not success is utter failure… Although I could defend all, or at any rate most, of these passages [from Plato], I do not venture to gainsay you. But this one thing I strongly affirm, that it is not possible to succeed greatly in any way without such daring and recklessness as must needs fail now and then. (tr. Rhys Roberts)

Except for Longinus, however, full statements of this argument have all been lost.

mindlessness of grudging envy: the phrase “grudging envy” is one word in Greek; it covers the range of English jealousy, envy, and grudging. Einarson suggests that the notion here refers to Attic law, “whereby the heirs to an es­ tate might charge the possessor of it with lunacy and thus preserve it from incompetent management.” Sophocles, according to tradition, was brought to court by his son under such a law; the old poet, in his eighties, pleaded his own case, which consisted of reciting passages from the last play of his life, the Oedipus at Co/onus. The judge is said to have thrown the case out of court.

while water...a-blooming: an anon­ ymous epitaph on Midas, attributed to, but certainly not by, Homer; it is quoted by Plato (Phaedrus 264D) as an exam­ ple of bad art, because the lines can be interchanged in any order and the poem will still make sense. Ben Johnson argued the same point of view-that a good poem ought to develop its argu­ ment. Grube translates the whole verse in his note:

I am a bronzen maiden, on Midas’ grave I lie,
Till stop the flowing waters, and tall trees cease to grow,
Forever here remaining, on this lamented tomb,
To those who pass by saying: “Midas is buried here.”

Russell quotes the Greek text, which appears in the Anthologia Palatina (7.153). Because the lines can be read in any order, Russell hints that it might have been intended to run around the sides of a tomb.

Perhaps, because of the cyclical form of the verses, Longinus means them to suggest the cycle or cycles of time; if, however, he intends his line to stand by itself, without a context, then his point will be that Homer, Plato, and the rest of the great authors will last as long as nature herself. We may recall the review of a would-be poet: “Mr. X’s poems will be read when Homer and Virgil are forgotten-but not until then.”

the one who wrote: Longinus gener­ ally refers to unspecified critics in the plural (e.g., the several references in ch. 32); perhaps, then, this singular points to Caecilius.

the Colossus: most probably a colossal statue of Nero. If, as Pliny the Elder suggests (Natural History 34.46), some diminution in the art of constructing colossi had occurred, then the flawed artistry of Nero’s colossus would make this allusion even more appropriate. On the relevance of the reference to the Colossus to the dating of Longinus, see our monograph Dating, pp. 2 and 39.

Polycleitus: Polycleitus flourished in the fifth century B.C. He was a theorist as well as an artist, for he wrote a book called Canon—i.e., a rule or standard— in which he discussed the proportions of the human figure and “explicated” his statue the Spear-bearer. Galen, in his “epode” to On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (l.352), says that Polycleitus is justly praised for the “analogy” (i.e., proportions) of his “canonical” statue, but if men knew of the inner proportions as well as the outer, they would praise nature more.

Many copies of Polycleitus’ statue survive; reproductions can be found in art-handbooks and anthologies and his­ tories, e.g., G. Richter’s The Sculpture and Sculptors of Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, 245-47).

statues...human being: in discussing the analogy of sculpture and literature, Longin us is disposing of one more false premise (made by Caecilius?), for the two arts are not, in Longinus’ eyes, analogous at all. Greek sculpture tended to be very representational even if it idealized what it imitated: there was nothing like our “abstract art,” for example. Of course, Greek artists and sculptors tried to catch the ethos—what we call the “spirit”—of their subject (see Plato, Sophist 265B-267B). But because it was tied to the human dimension, it could not be so great as “speeches and writings,” which are man’s natural way of grasping nature and her greatness. So, too, in ch. 39 Longin us argues that speeches and writings are superior to music.

as I said: in ch. 35, which in turn was the outgrowth of the great parenthesis on figures, which was in turn a part of the fivefold division of the elements that constitute sublimity, which was in turn the formal statement that followed from the introduction. As Longinus will say in the next sentence, he is ready to start back to the beginning of his thesis. The starting point toward which Longinus is now bending back came in ch. 2, where he had raised the problem of whether sublimity comes by art or nature. Despite the long variety of his proofs, he has never forgotten his main point, which underlies every step in his argument.

turns us back: the root term gives the technical word for that part of a race­ course where the runners turn to start back for the starting point. The racing metaphor contributes to the athletic imagery sustained over the past few chapters.

collection of notes: Longinus uses this word only three times: here; in 1.2, where he says that Terentianus has urged him to get his notes together; and in 44.12, the last sentence of the extant text, where he refers to a similar collec­ tion of notes dealing with the emotions—now, alas, lost. His studied use of the self-deprecatory word is part and parcel of his academic wit.

pre-eminence (even though uneven): the little clause (“even though uneven”) is one more turn of the screw in Longi­ nus’ hyperbaton, although it is, of course, a necessary qualification in what he regards as his comprehensive state­ ment of his theory.

“Pre-eminence” is used here for the first time as a synonym for “sublimity.” The word is used of the peaks of moun­ tains, of the rising of stars, of hyperbolic excess, and of periphrasis in oratory. It is particularly appropriate here because of its astronomical and political senses, and especially the latter, for the ups and downs of political power are notorious. The little clause (“even though un­ even”) may have been put in where it is as a joke, to assure the Roman Terenti­ anus that Longinus is talking about rhetoric-although, as both the first and last chapters of the work show, he has bigger game in mind.

perfection: implicit here is the ancient notion that perfection was attainable. Longinus thinks—or dreams—of a day when technique and nature would be so complementary as to enable men to fulfill nature’s gift of potential sublimity by means of a technique which was itself sublime in comparison to the kind of pronouncements laid down by the rhetorical handbooks. What such an enlightened and illuminating doctrine of rhetoric might be Longinus has pre­ sented in his “specimen” chapters 9-43. The better ancient rhetorical critics—like Dionysius of Halicarnassus— grasped this need clearly. Dionysius makes two similar statements on the value of technique; at the end of ch. 25 (On Composition), comparing great artists to athletes, he says that those who have learned to read well must suppose a superior training in those who have learned to write well, and he adds:

And it is not unnatural that those who are ignorant of this or un­ versed in any profession what­ soever should be surprised when they hear that anything is exe­ cuted with such mastery by an­ other as the result of artistic train­ ing. This may suffice as a rejoinder to those who are accustomed to scoff at the rules of the rhetorical manuals.(tr. Rhys Roberts)

And at the very end of the book, he remarks:

No rules contained in rhetorical manuals can suffice to make ex­ perts of those who are determined to dispense with study and prac­ tice. They who are ready to under­ go toil and hardship can alone decide whether such rules are triv­ ial and useless, or worthy of serious consideration.(tr. Rhys Roberts)

The phrase for “serious consideration” is literally “worthy of logos.”

Thoreau’s words (Walden, ch. 3), applied only to reading, make a demand on the reader as great as Dionysius makes on the would-be author:

It [reading] requires a training such as the athletes underwent, the steady intention almost of the whole life to this object. Books must be read as deliberately and reservedly as they are written.

Although, of course, the demand im­ plies a Baconian discrimination of books (Of Studies):

Some books are to be tasted, oth­ ers to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.

Consequently, when Longinus suggests the possibility that technique and na­ ture may provide mutual support that results in perfection, he expresses the Greek-and Aristotelian-idea of telos or perfection. Aristotle defines nature (Physics 193b8-22) as the state of anything which, after undergoing change, reaches its telos, its final perfection or end.

So many things...pleases him: again Longinus demurs and deprecates him­ self. The phrase “so many things” seems at first to refer to the past few chapters, in which Longinus has been developing a “full theory,” but in fact it includes both these chapters, his “expo­ sition,” and his “proofs,” his “demon­ stration.” He uses the term “critical judgment” with care, for that is what he requested of Terentianus in ch. I. One hesitates to “psychologize” an author, especially when his phrases are conven­ tional; but in the concluding clause “let each delight in what pleases him” one senses that Longinus is aware of how little impact he is going to have on his world. And it is a fact that aside from this text, we seem to find no mention of him in all the ancient literature that survives.